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Abstract
In this paper I study gender wage di¤erentials in Italy using rst-order pre-
dictions of monopsony and search models. Using di¤erent empirical strate-
gies, I provide estimates of the labour supply elasticity facing a single rm.
Results indicate that rms can (third degree) wage discriminate because the
elasticity of labour supply to the rm is lower for women, as postulated by
the monopsony model. I also use the abolition of a wage indexation mecha-
nism (Scala Mobile) as an experiment to test the predictions of monopsony
against other models. By comparing correlations of changes in relative em-
ployment and relative wages of men and women before and after the reform,
I nd that relative employment of men responded positively to the exoge-
nous wage increase in the relative wage di¤erential.
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1 Introduction
What can monopsony explain of the gender wage di¤erential? Which is the relative
importance of market forces and institutions in determining the wage di¤erential?
Is Italy an interesting case to study these issues? This paper tries to answer above
questions by directly looking at the static and dynamic empirical implications of
a standard monopsony-search model on administrative data.
Actually, there are many reasons for the monopsony model to explain the gen-
der wage di¤erential. In a labour market with information frictions, rms can
(third degree) wage discriminate and pay lower wages to the group of workers that
has lower elasticity of labour supply.1 Of course this requires two conditions to
be met. First, it is necessary to provide an empirical estimate of labour supply
elasticity that shows that rms can e¤ectively exploit their monopsony power in
setting wages. Second, and most important for this study, which is the role of
such theoretical models in labour markets (as Italy) characterised by centralised
bargaining agreements and strong union power? To accomplish this task, I of-
fer some evidence showing women have slightly lower labour supply elasticities
and wage discriminating rms can pay lower wages to them. I also exploit some
institutional changes in wage bargaining structure at the beginning of the 1990s
as an experiment to test the importance of the monopsony model against other
competing theories to explain gender di¤erentials.
The literature on gender wage di¤erentials is huge.2 Most of the studies high-
light the importance of productivity di¤erentials and discrimination as potential
explanations for the wage gap. However, there are very few papers explicitly look-
ing at gender di¤erentials in a monopsony-search perspective. This is somewhat
surprising, in fact these models postulate di¤erences in search behaviour, some-
thing one would expect when looking at the data. However, there are a few relevant
exceptions. Green et al. (1996) and Manning (1996) provide rst pioneering ex-
amples of applications to test the relevance of the predictions of the monopsony
model. The former paper studies the importance of monopsony to explain the
employer-size wage e¤ect and to test the model against other competing expla-
nations of the positive relationship between employer size and wages. The latter,
using the introduction of the Equal Pay Act in Britain in the 1970s as an exper-
iment to test theories of wage determination, highlights the relative role played
by imperfect competition to explain patterns in relative wage and relative em-
1I refer to labour elasticity to the individual rm, and not to the market as a whole. The
latter is usually estimated somewhat higher for women. For Italy, Aaberge et al. (1999) conrm
this result.
2Recent surveys by Altonji and Blank (1999) discuss in detail the literature. Boeri et al.
(2005) give an overview of the main stylised facts in the labour market with focus on gender
issues and policy debates.
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ployment. He actually nds that after the legislated increase in wages for women,
there was no substantial decrease in employment, contrary to what is predicted by
standard competitive models. Barth and Dale-Olsen (1999) use matched employer-
employee data from Norway to provide a measure of labour supply elasticity to the
individual rm. Using the dynamic version of the monopsony model, they show
that male turnover is more wage-elastic than female turnover, as predicted by the
monopsony model.3
In general, most of the renewed interest in this approach is inspired by inu-
ential contributions by Card and Krueger (1995) on the employment e¤ects of the
minimum wage and, more recently, by Manning (2003). These contributions point
out that some stylised facts and policy interventions in the labour market can be
properly interpreted and understood if one is ready to abandon the framework of
the purely competitive model of wage and employment determination. By using
both UK and US data, Manning (2003) shows the importance of monopsony to
understand classic stylised facts in the labour market as gender di¤erentials, in-
dustry and size di¤erentials, tenure and experience e¤ects and discrimination. He
also discusses in detail how competing theories can explain the same facts, and in
which respects the monopsony model is to be preferred as a likely explanation.4
Most studies are referred to the US and the UK, typical examples of decen-
tralised wage setting labour markets. This paper tries to ll a little gap in the
literature by considering rst order predictions of the monopsony-search model us-
ing Italian labour market data, where wage bargaining agreements are centralised
with strong union presence with no space left for employerswage policies (Teulings
and Hartog, 1998). To the best of my knowledge this is one of the few attempts
in this direction. In particular, I estimate the labour supply elasticity facing a
single rm using di¤erent empirical specications. This should give a measure of
the importance of imperfect competition in the labour market and of the distance
of wages from marginal productivity. I expect to nd some di¤erences between
men and women for a couple of reasons. These are mirrored in behavioural para-
meters of search and monopsony models. Just to mention a few: higher turnover
for women implies they invest less in the labour market, decreasing the arrival
rate of o¤ers and increasing the job destruction rate and consequently increasing
the exploitation rate. Also, if rms have monopsony power in setting wages, by
compressing the wage distribution, they reduce incentives to search for better jobs,
3Bowlus (1997) is an examples of structural estimation of behavioural parameters of equi-
librium search models with gender di¤erentials. Sulis (2007) provides structural estimates for
Italy.
4Boal and Ransom (1997) and Bhaskar et al. (2002) provide general reviews and evidence.
Sullivan (1989), Boal (1995), Falch (2003), Hirsch and Schumacher (2004) and Staiger et al.
(2004) are examples of applications of monopsony to di¤erent labour markets. Fakhfakh and
Fitzroy (2006) use rm data to test the monopsony model.
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decreasing upward mobility. Finally, women can have some comparative advan-
tage in homework, increasing their productivity and limiting their chances in the
labour market.
The empirical section of the paper uses INPS Italian Administrative Data for
the period 1985-1996 on young workers employed in the private sector. It is divided
in three parts, each tries to recover an estimate of labour supply elasticity for men
and women to identify the importance of monopsony power of rms. In general,
the estimated coe¢ cients are di¤erent for women and for men, and wages are far
from the perfectly competitive benchmark; however, alternative methods provides
slightly di¤erent quantitative results. The rst method uses standard regression
function to look at the employer size-wage e¤ect for both groups of workers; the
positive relationship between wages and employment is interpreted as a labour
supply curve to the individual rm (Manning, 2003). Employer size e¤ects by
sector of activity indicate that larger e¤ects for women are found in less unionised
sectors, where bargaining agreements give employers the possibility of two stage
wage determination. This is in line with the monopsony model. Then, I use the
theoretical dynamic monopsony-search model of Burdett and Mortensen (1998)
to estimate labour supply elasticities using the wage elasticity of separations and
recruits. Using steady state theoretical conditions that relate the two elasticities,
I can recover an estimate of the parameters of interest; with very low values of
the elasticity of labour supply, especially for women. Finally in the last section,
I use relative employment e¤ects from a natural experiment to discriminate
between the monopsony and alternative models. I use institutional changes in wage
indexation mechanism at work in Italy (Scala Mobile) to look at the relationship
between relative changes in male/female employment and relative changes in the
gender wage di¤erential.5 Actually, I nd that relative male employment responded
positively to the relative increase in the wage di¤erential, although the statistical
signicance of the exercise is not good enough for inference.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, I present the
theoretical model of monopsony, both in its static pure version and in the dynamic
one. Then, in Section 3, I look at the empirical implications of this model using
various techniques. Conclusions are in Section 4.
5My paper doesnt provide an evaluation of the e¤ects of the abolition of Scala Mobile on
gender wage di¤erentials, but simply uses this as a test of theories of the labour market. Erickson
and Ichino (1995) provide interesting evidence and tentative explanations of the dynamics of
gender di¤erentials in Italy with particular attention to returns to education. Using household
information on earnings and education from the Bank of Italy, Manacorda (2004) looks at the
importance of Scala Mobile on the compression of the wage distribution and subsequent increase
of inequality between 1977 and 1993.
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2 Theoretical Framework
In this section, I present two very simple versions of the standard monopsony
model, one is static, the other is dynamic. The standard textbook model of monop-
sony serves the purposes of illustration and doesnt aim at being realistic. However,
it provides some important insights about the dynamic modern version provided
by Burdett and Mortensen (1998) discussed in next subsection. In that framework,
the labour market is characterised as an environment in which workers search for
jobs and rms post wage o¤ers. Because of important information frictions, when
posting wages, rms exert some monopsony power under a binding equal prot
condition. High paying rms reduce quit rates and increase their labour force but
make less prots per worker; on the other hand, low paying rms loose their work-
ers because of quitting, but make more prots out of each worker they employ. The
model features an equilibrium distribution of wage o¤ers and has important em-
pirically testable implications. Before analysing the modern version of the model,
following Manning (2003), I briey present the textbook model of monopsony.
2.1 Static Model of Monopsony
Suppose in the labour market there is only one single rm that pays a wage w to
all workers. Let L(w) denote the labour supply curve to the rm and w(L) its
inverse. Given a level of employment L, total labour costs are w(L)L, and revenue
function is Y (L) where the price of output is normalised to 1. The rm maximizes
prots  optimally choosing the level of employment L
 = Y (L)  w(L)L: (1)
The rst order condition states that marginal revenues equal marginal costs
Y 0(L) = w(L) + w0(L)L: (2)
Given rms have some market power in setting wages, workers are paid less then
their marginal product and there is a mark-up between the marginal product and
the wage. Rearranging equation (2) and using the denition of elasticity of labour
supply "Lw = wL0(w)=L(w), it is possible to obtain a measure of exploitation of
workers " = "wL based on the elasticity of labour supply to the rm. It reads as
Y 0(L)  w(L)
w(L)
=
1
"Lw
= "wL = "; (3)
where the gap between the marginal revenue product and the wage depends neg-
atively on the elasticity of labour supply facing the rm. Benchmark case is given
by a perfectly competitive labour market ("Lw = 1 and " = 0) where the gap is
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Figure 1: The Static Model of Monopsony
zero and the wage equals marginal product. Viceversa, for very low values of the
elasticity, the exploitation rate goes to innity. The working hypothesis in this
paper is that the labour supply elasticity is positive but low and quite far from the
competitive benchmark. The whole analysis can be summarised in Figure 1. The
graph shows that employment is determined where marginal product is equal to
the marginal cost of labour, with lower equilibrium wage and lower employment
than the competitive outcome.6
2.2 Dynamic Search Model of Oligopsony
The dynamic general equilibrium model of monopsony presented in this subsection
is Burdett and Mortensen (1998).7 Workers are identical and there is a mass M
of them, U denotes the number of unemployed. There is also a continuum of rms
that use labour as only factor of production. The value of leisure is b, common to
all workers. Let p denote the productivity of workers. When employed, workers
earn a wage w; facing an exogenous probability of arrival of new job o¤ers  and
6In this paper I dont consider the di¤erence between short and long-run elasticities. Note
also that, as Boal and Ransom (1997) highlight, the exploitation rate is not necessarily measuring
the distance of wages from the competitive equilibrium, but the distance from workers marginal
product of labour.
7See Bhaskar et al. (2002) for denitions of oligopsony.
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the possibility of job destruction . Workers quit if and only if get a better o¤er
in terms of monetary values. Firms are identical and post wages in the support of
the wage o¤er distribution F (w): Employment L at time t evolves as follows
Lt = [1  s(wt)]Lt 1 +R(wt); (4)
where s(wt) and R(wt) are separation rate and recruitment ow. In a steady state,
with constant level of employment L, the ow of separations is equal to the ow
of recruits, so that
L(w) =
R(w)
s(w)
: (5)
Taking logs and di¤erentiating, we get
"Lw = "Rw   "sw; (6)
where the elasticity of the labour supply curve facing the rm is equal to the
di¤erence between the elasticity of recruits and separations to the wage paid.
Separation and recruitment rates are given by
s(w) =  + [1  F (w)]; (7)
R(w) = U + 
Z w
f(x)L(x)dx; (8)
where the rst term includes recruits from unemployment and the second recruits
from other rms. Di¤erentiating both separation and recruitment functions with
respect to the wage, we get
s0(w) =  f(w);
R0(w) = f(w)L(w):
Then, write the elasticity of separations
"sw =
s0(w)w
s(w)
=
 f(w)w
s(w)
=
 f(w)wL(w)
R(w)
=  R
0(w)w
R(w)
=  "Rw (9)
where the steady state condition s(w) = R(w)=L(w) is used. Using the latter
condition and equations (7) and (8), the equilibrium ow condition reads as
( + [1  F (w)])L(w) = U + 
Z w
f(x)L(x)dx:
Given rms paying the lowest wages will not attract any worker, their size, L, is
given by
L =
U
+ 
: (10)
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Unemployment is obtained by imposing (M   U) = U . Inserting the denition
of unemployment in equation (10) we obtain
L =
kM
(1 + k)2
; (11)
where k = = is a summary measure of labour market frictions. As in the static
model presented above, equilibrium prots are given by  = (p   w(L))L for all
rms.
The model above has some directly testable empirical implications. The rst
is the following proposition:
Proposition 1 (Green et al., 1996) In equilibrium the employer size-wage ef-
fect is, given rm size, increasing in the equilibrium level of prots.
This says that, if there is an employer-size wage e¤ect, the latter is increasing in
the level of prots. These are higher where monopsony is higher. So, it is important
to identify segments of the labour market where prots (and monopsony) are
higher. These are identied by the second proposition:
Proposition 2 (Green et al., 1996) 1) If unions reduce prots, the employer-
size wage e¤ect is weaker in the union sector. 2) If rms set wages, for a given
employer size, the elasticity of wages with respect to rm size "wL is decreasing in
k = = if k > 1 and increasing if k < 1:
The intuition for the above proposition is the following: if unions increase
wages, the di¤erence between p and w is reduced; given the lowest o¤ered wage
is the reservation wage, equilibrium prots are given by (p   b)L, so a change in
the level of frictions has an e¤ect on L, i.e., the size of the smallest rm. This
e¤ect is negative because higher k allows workers to climb the wage ladder quickly,
reducing the size of the smallest rm. The second part of the proposition calls
for identication of groups of workers that have di¤erent k0s. Men and women are
natural candidates for this test. The fact that k > 1 has strong support in the
literature.8
3 Estimating the Labour Supply Elasticity
In this section, I follow Manning (2003) and discuss how one can interpret stan-
dard empirical stylised facts on gender and rm size di¤erentials as evidence in
8See Jolivet et al. (2005) for European Countries and US. See Sulis (2007) for evidence on
this data.
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favor of the monopsonistic model against other competing models, with particu-
lar attention to rent sharing, unobserved worker quality and compensating wage
di¤erentials. I estimate regressions separately for men and women. In fact, there
are many reasons for these di¤erential outcomes between men and women. The
monopsony and equilibrium search models with frictions have some empirical pre-
dictions to expect the elasticity of labor supply for women to be smaller. Some
possible explanations for di¤erent turnover behaviour of men and women are in
di¤erent levels of search frictions they face (Barth and Dale-Olsen, 1999).
The level of labour market frictions (summarised by low arrival rates of of-
fers  and high job destruction rate ) is expected to be di¤erent for a couple of
reasons. Labour market history of men, in terms of wages, promotions, mobility,
and unemployment has bigger impact on women than the other way around. For
this reason, women should have higher job destruction rates. Domestic respon-
sibilities within the household. In particular, child rearing has a major impact
on womens career; again, the job destruction rate should be higher. What is
more, market mechanisms can determine di¤erent outcomes. Higher turnover for
women implies they invest less in the labour market and choose sectors and occu-
pations in which turnover gains are lower; this reduces the arrival rate of o¤ers.
If rms have monopsony power in setting wages and they compress the wage dis-
tribution for them, lower dispersion reduces incentive to search and then reduces
arrival rate of o¤ers. Finally, women can have some comparative advantage in
homework, increasing their productivity and limiting their chances in the labour
market; again, this reduces the arrival rate of o¤ers. Above intuition suggest that
I should nd a larger size e¤ect "wL for women as their mobility decision are more
constrained, increasing the level of frictions and contributing to reduce the labour
supply elasticity to the individual rm "Lw for women.
The empirical strategy has three parts. First, I look at the employer size-
wage e¤ect and interpret this as a labour supply curve to the individual rm; I
also use reverse regressions to identify the elasticity of labour supply. Second, I
use a dynamic version of the monopsony model to estimate wage elasticities of
separations and recruits to identify the labour supply elasticity to the individual
rm. Third, I use some institutional changes in a wage indexation mechanism a
natural experiment to test the relative importance of monopsony against the
labour demand theory (competitive or the right-to-manage union model).9
9Another possibility is to provide structural estimation of transition parameters in an equilib-
rium search model for both men and women. In that framework, the relative role of productivity
di¤erentials and discrimination is also identied. See Bowlus (1997) and Sulis (2007) for examples
in this direction.
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3.1 Data
The data used in this study is from the Italian Administrative Social Security
Archive (INPS).10 Detailed information about labour market histories of workers
employed in the private sector is available for the period 1985-1996. Demographic
characteristics of workers are matched with relevant information about the rm
they are currently working at, as sector of activity, average number of employees
and age of rm. Given the longitudinal structure of the data, it is possible to track
the entire career of workers and easily construct the variables object of study.
The compensation measure is yearly wages.11 From the dataset, I extract a
subsample of workers that entered the labour market between 1985 and 1995. I
use a sample of very young workers working full time (younger than 25 at entry).
In Table 1, I report descriptive statistics for the sample used in the estimation.
First, note that womens wages are about 10% lower than the ones for men. The
sample is composed by quite young workers, average age is about 24 years for
both men and women. The two groups show interesting di¤erences in the amount
of experience and tenure accumulated, with men having higher experience and
women having higher tenure. The distribution of workers across rm size in not
very di¤erent, but it is interesting to note women are much more concentrated
in the service sector, while they are absent from the construction sector. Finally,
a signicant proportion of women works under a "public contract", the latter is
typical in the service sector and is very similar to contractual agreements in the
public sector.
3.2 Employer Size-Wage E¤ect
The starting point of the analysis is to test some rst-order implications of the
monopsony-search model. As anticipated in previous section, the rst testable
implication is that the employer size-wage e¤ect is, given rm size, increasing in
the level of prots. That is to say, the size e¤ect is larger where the monopsony
power is higher (Green et al., 1996). So, it is necessary to identify groups of workers
in the labour market that are supposed to be more likely to be characterised as
monopsonistic and test if this turns out to be conrmed in the data. I do this
comparing men and women and try to look at the gender gap in this perspective.
The rst thing I do is to regress the log of yearly wages against dummies for
employment size, where the benchmark is the group 16-100. Results are reported
in Table 2. Note that men and women are almost equally distributed across rm
10See Contini (2002) for details about this data.
11Following Contini (2002), yearly wages are deated with the CPI at 1996 prices. Part-time
workers are dropped from the sample. The overall sample selection procedure is available upon
request.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Men Women
variable average st dev average st dev
yearly wage 15258 11654 14031 10174
age 23.87 4.31 23.69 4.01
experience 3.65 2.88 3.55 2.79
tenure 2.16 2.26 2.32 2.32
apprentices 0.16 0.36 0.14 0.35
blue collars 0.66 0.47 0.40 0.48
white collars 0.18 0.37 0.46 0.49
1-5 0.27 0.44 0.27 0.44
6-15 0.23 0.42 0.23 0.42
16-99 0.27 0.44 0.26 0.43
100-499 0.12 0.32 0.11 0.31
500+ 0.11 0.31 0.12 0.32
shing 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.05
mining 0.02 0.14 0.00 0.08
manufacturing 0.48 0.49 0.43 0.49
construction 0.17 0.37 0.01 0.11
commerce 0.19 0.39 0.22 0.41
transport 0.04 0.19 0.01 0.11
credit 0.04 0.19 0.10 0.29
services 0.07 0.23 0.22 0.41
national contract 0.85 0.21 0.78 0.41
regional contract 0.01 0.35 0.01 0.08
rm contract 0.02 0.08 0.01 0.07
provincial contract 0.01 0.13 0.01 0.12
public contract 0.03 0.11 0.11 0.31
no contract 0.04 0.16 0.04 0.18
unknown contract 0.05 0.19 0.04 0.18
north-west 0.35 0.47 0.37 0.48
north-east 0.28 0.44 0.33 0.47
centre 0.17 0.38 0.17 0.38
south 0.20 0.39 0.13 0.33
weeks paid 33.12 18.82 33.78 18.67
Note: Wages are expressed in 000s of Italian Lira.
Durations are expressed in years.
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Table 2: The Employer Size-Wage E¤ect
Firm Size Men Women
Sample % (1) (2) Sample % (3) (4)
1-5 26:57  0:429
(0:0083)
 0:130
(0:0035)
27:34  0:232
(0:0100)
 0:077
(0:0047)
6-15 23:81  0:189
(0:0083)
 0:064
(0:0032)
23:07  0:156
(0:0101)
 0:055
(0:0041)
16-99 26:90 benchmark 26:04 benchmark
100-499 11:82 0:190
(0:0141)
0:055
(0:0056)
11:24 0:037
(0:0212)
0:051
(0:0083)
500+ 10:89 0:560
(0:0267)
0:175
(0:0105)
12:31 0:397
(0:0357)
0:243
(0:0144)
Controls No Y es No Y es
Observations 322; 508 322; 397 211; 765 211; 705
R2 0:07 0:82 0:03 0:79
Note: Dep. var. log of yearly wages. Robust std errors in parentheses.
Controls are indicated in text.
sizes. It is also no surprise to observe that many workers are employed at very
small rms as typical for the Italian economy.12 Working in a rm with more
than 500 employees instead of working in a medium (16-99 employees) rm gives
a premium of more than 56% for men and around 39% for women. In columns (2)
and (4), I add controls for age, number of weeks paid during the year, experience,
tenure, sectorial dummies, regional dummies, type of bargaining agreement and
year dummies. The reduction in coe¢ cients for the employer-size e¤ect indicates
that part of that can be attributable to worker heterogeneity and composition ef-
fects. Still, the positive relation between paid wages and size is monotonic and also
robust to the inclusion of further controls. There are some interesting di¤erences
across men and women. The employer size-wage e¤ect estimated without controls
is slightly higher for men; however, controlling for other characteristics, women
are found to get higher premia for working in large rms. This evidence suggests
that the monopsony model can help to explain the gender wage di¤erential: given
there are frictions in the market, an observed larger size e¤ects for women is what
one should expect to nd if the labour market is monopsonistic.
12According to the ISTAT census gures for 1996 as regards the distribution of rms by number
of employees, 95% of rms have fewer than 9 employees, 3.2% between 10 and 19 employees,
1.3% between 20 and 49 employees, 0.4% between 50 and 249, and only 0.07% more than 250
employees. In 1996 the average number of employees per rm was 3.9. In 1996, the ISTAT census
showed that 47% of the labour force worked in rms with fewer than 9 employees, 11% in rms
with between 10 and 19 employees, 10.1% in rms with between 20 and 49 employees, 11.7% in
rms with between 50 and 249 employees, and 20.7% in rms with more than 250 employees.
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Table 3: The Elasticity of Wages to Employer Size
Estimation method Men Women
Controls Elasticity Obs R2 Elasticity Obs R2
Cross section No 0:135
(0:0035)
322; 508 0:07 0:088
(0:0041)
211; 765 0:03
Y es 0:034
(0:0019)
322; 397 0:82 0:043
(0:0019)
211; 705 0:79
Fixed e¤ects No 0:171
(0:0013)
322; 508 0:05 0:137
(0:0018)
211; 765 0:02
Y es 0:035
(0:0006)
322; 397 0:80 0:026
(0:0009)
211; 705 0:78
FE, movers No 0:097
(0:0031)
73; 534 0:02 0:089
(0:0045)
42; 760 0:01
Y es 0:026
(0:0017)
73; 515 0:72 0:016
(0:0027)
42; 747 0:67
Note: Dep. var. log of yearly wages. Robust std errors in parentheses.
Controls are indicated in text.
Results above indicate that there is a statistical correlation between wages
paid and employer size. However, many competing theories are able to explain
this stylised fact. In what follows, I try to shed some light on these issues and
try to nd if the monopsony model is able to explain these regularities against
some other model. One candidate alternative explanation is that workers could
select themselves in high paying rms. Workersquality di¤ers across rms, so both
observable and unobservable characteristics could drive these spurious results. The
most simple thing to do is to control for unobserved heterogeneity estimating a
xed e¤ects model in which I put on the right side the log of employment at the
rm, i.e., regress the change in log wages on the change in log employment. In the
second step I also include more controls. Results for cross section elasticities and
xed e¤ects are reported in Table 3.
Regression results indicate that heterogeneity is an important issue (as ex-
pected). Interestingly, xed e¤ects estimates are substantially higher than stan-
dard cross sections, at least when not controlling for observable characteristics,
this is true for both men and women. However, there is much more di¤erence
for women, indicating unobserved heterogeneity can play di¤erent roles in wage
determination. Adding controls to xed e¤ects estimates substantially reduces the
coe¢ cients, in this case the employer size e¤ect is about 3.5% for men and 2.6%
for women. Finally, using the sample of movers, coe¢ cients are further reduced.
These gures point out that the employer size e¤ect could also be driven by unob-
served quality and this should be considered when looking at the gender wage gap.
Naturally, from these preliminary results, it is di¢ cult to discriminate between
di¤erent theories.
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Table 4: Mobility and Employer Size
Men Women
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log employer size  0:084
(0:0012)
 0:055
(0:0017)
 0:032
(0:0015)
 0:040
(0:0015)
 0:053
(0:0019)
 0:038
(0:0020)
Log wage  0:415
(0:0034)
 0:317
(0:0042)
Controls No Y es Y es No Y es Y es
Observations 277; 918 277; 815 277; 815 179; 668 179; 615 179; 615
Pseudo-R2 0:01 0:21 0:26 0:00 0:21 0:24
Note: Dep. var. prob. job change. Robust std errors in parentheses.
Controls are indicated in text.
Another possible theoretical explanation is that the labour market is competi-
tive and employer size di¤erentials are simply compensating di¤erentials. Working
in large rms can result in worse working conditions, that could be compensated
by paying higher wages. To check this issue, I tabulate transition probabilities
by rm size. The main idea is that, if the employer size e¤ect is driven by com-
pensating di¤erentials, workers should quit all rms with the same probability.
Results, not reported, show that male workers in very large establishments (more
than 500 workers) are less likely to quit. Women show a constant separation rate.
To further check this, I run a probit regression where the dependent variable is
the probability of changing job on employer size and other variables.
Some interesting results emerge from Table 4. The probability of changing job
is negatively related to previous employer size for both men and women indicating
that workers are less likely to quit large rms, contrary to what is predicted by the
compensating wage di¤erential theory. Adding controls in column (2), the e¤ect is
substantially reduced for men, while slightly increases for women (column 5) and
they are substantially similar. Finally, controlling also for previous wages in third
and sixth columns, the negative relation decreases in magnitude, i.e., workers in
large establishments are less likely to quit. As expected, the coe¢ cient on the
previous wage is negative. This indicates that, all else being equal, high wage
workers are less likely to quit their jobs. Interestingly, the coe¢ cient for women
is lower, indicating that probably their choice of moving is less related to money
reasons.
One last possibility for the employer size-wage e¤ect to arise is that the labour
market is not competitive but there are again asymmetric information and rents.
The rst possibility is that as rms get larger, it is more di¢ cult to monitor workers
and then it is necessary to pay them higher wages to deter them shirking (e¢ ciency
wages). On the other hand, rent sharing would suggest that some rms get high
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rents and share them with workers (Teulings and Hartog, 1998). If this is the
case, I should expect to observe larger employer size e¤ect in sectors where there
are more rents to share. Rent sharing would predict these rents are associated
with union presence, as more organised workers are able to extract more rents.
However, the absence of any information regarding prots and rents in this data,
the only possibility is to control for union and non-union sectors. If unions reduce
rents, as predicted by the monopsony model, I should observe weaker employer
size-wage e¤ect in sectors in which unions are stronger.
Unfortunately, I dont have such information and just look at employer size-
wage e¤ect for eight di¤erent sectors while controlling for their unionisation (den-
sity) rate. Results are reported in Table 5. I do nd some minor di¤erences across
sectors, with somewhat larger e¤ects for women in some industries. In particular,
credit and service sectors have lower union density, and the size e¤ect is larger,
as the monopsony model predicts. What is more, in the credit sector, the e¤ect
is larger for women, as postulated by the theory. Note also size e¤ects are lower
in strongly unionised sectors, as transport; with basically no di¤erences between
men and women, as also found in the manufacturing sector.
To further investigate this issue, I try to look at di¤erent bargaining agree-
ments. Clearly, I expect to nd stronger e¤ects where unions are weaker, i.e.,
the employer e¤ect should be higher where there are more rents to share.13 Firm
level bargaining should result in higher e¤ects. Results are reported in Table 6.
It is denitely interesting what emerges from regressions stratied by contractual
agreements. As expected, the employer size-wage e¤ect is larger at rms that
bargain wages in two steps, i.e., by adding a wage drift to the base national con-
tractual wage. As predicted by the monopsony model, the e¤ect is higher where
prots are higher and there are more rents to share. Interestingly, women benet
larger size e¤ects at those rms. This contrast with the rent sharing hypothesis
that predicts workers with more labour market attachment (men) should be able
to extract more rents and show higher size e¤ects. Instead, stronger e¤ects for
women could suggest the monopsony model can be used as a good benchmark to
interpret these ndings.
3.3 Reverse Regressions
Estimates of the labour supply elasticity to an individual rm obtained by looking
at the employer size wage e¤ect are simple to calculate. Cross section estimates
indicate that "wL for men is about 0.034 and for women is about 0.043, after
controlling for some observable characteristics. Using equation (3), these gures
suggest that the elasticity of labour supply "Lw = 1="wL is in the region between
13Bargaining agreement is endogenous, however I dont consider these issues in this paper.
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Table 5: Size E¤ects by Sector
Sector Union Density % Men Women
1980 1997 sample % coe¤. sample % coe¤.
shing     0:53  0:027
(0:0075)
0:29 0:020
(0:0011)
mining     2:07 0:037
(0:0016)
0:72 0:036
(0:0029)
manufacturing 56 39 47:81 0:046
(0:0005)
42:60 0:045
(0:0008)
construction 36 42 16:58 0:049
(0:0013)
1:27 0:036
(0:0043)
commerce 22 23 19:10 0:017
(0:0012)
22:03 0:009
(0:0012)
transport 77 57 4:10 0:030
(0:0017)
1:22 0:031
(0:0036)
credit 33 17 4:15 0:049
(0:0014)
9:97 0:055
(0:0011)
services 38 29 5:66 0:047
(0:0023)
21:91 0:042
(0:0014)
Note: Union density data are from Boeri et al. (2001), Table 2.2.
Dep. var. log of yearly wages. Robust std errors in parentheses.
Table 6: Size E¤ects by Contractual Agreement
Contract Men Women
sample % coe¤. sample % coe¤.
national 84:77 0:040
(0:0007)
78:04 0:039
(0:0009)
regional 0:66 0:039
(0:0125)
0:60 0:034
(0:0119)
rm 1:84 0:062
(0:0042)
1:51 0:069
(0:0053)
provincial 1:43 0:054
(0:0058)
0:79 0:038
(0:0101)
public 2:65 0:041
(0:0051)
10:97 0:013
(0:0036)
no contract 3:84 0:045
(0:0029)
3:59 0:044
(0:0035)
unknown 4:81 0:035
(0:0036)
4:49 0:050
(0:0039)
Note: Dep. var. log of yearly wages.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 7: Reverse Regressions
Men Women Controls
"wL "Lw "wL "Lw Indiv. Occup. Reg. Sect. Contr. Other
0:135
(0:0035)
0:541
(0:0364)
0:088
(0:0041)
0:354
(0:0209)
No No No No No No
0:065
(0:0030)
0:433
(0:0256)
0:054
(0:0030)
0:339
(0:0220)
Yes No No No No No
0:054
(0:0029)
0:345
(0:0184)
0:047
(0:0030)
0:297
(0:0212)
Yes Yes No No No No
0:052
(0:0028)
0:328
(0:0189)
0:046
(0:0030)
0:291
(0:0215)
Yes Yes Yes No No No
0:050
(0:0029)
0:291
(0:0127)
0:051
(0:0032)
0:298
(0:0200)
Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
0:051
(0:0030)
0:281
(0:0114)
0:065
(0:0031)
0:322
(0:0158)
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
0:034
(0:0019)
0:285
(0:0115)
0:040
(0:0018)
0:323
(0:0160)
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Controls are indicated in text.
23 and 30 and slightly higher for men. This would suggest the exploitation rate is
quite low and that workers are not that far from earning their marginal product.
However, as Manning (2003) suggests, it is also possible to recover an estimate
of this elasticity by running some reverse regressions of the log of employment on
the log of wages, so that it is possible to recover a direct estimate of "Lw and
then get the inverse obtaining the exploitation rate " (i.e., "wL). In principle these
two exercises should give the same result for the elasticity of labour supply to the
individual rm.
Looking at Table 7, it is immediately clear that there is a large gap between
the two estimates.14 Note also that the estimates for "wL decrease as controls are
added, while estimates for 1="Lw increase.15 Moreover, reverse regression estimates
suggest that men are slightly more subject to monopsony power than women. This
a striking result and it is di¢ cult to reconcile with previous evidence. Some back-
of-the-envelope calculations establish that, after controlling for most of observable
characteristics, womens wage are well below their marginal product, the same is
true for men.
Above results call for some preliminary comments. First, correctly estimating
the labour supply elasticity is very di¢ cult because of the complicated biases
14Note that these gap is also found by Manning (2003) for the UK with identical pattern but
di¤erent magnitude of coe¢ cient. In the last subsection I compare my results to his estimates.
15In Table 7 controls are as follows. Individual controls are age, age squared, experience,
experience squared, tenure, tenure squared; occupational are dummies for occupation, regional
are dummies for region of work, sectorial are dummies for sectors, contracts are dummies for
di¤erent bargaining agreements, and other refers to year dummies.
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involved. The latter derive from unobserved shocks to marginal revenue product
of labour and supply that induce opposite movements for wages and employment.
In particular, it is relative variances and correlations of errors in the equations
that seems to drive results. What is more, the latter seem to inuence results
in opposite directions depending on the method used to estimate the elasticity of
labour supply, and further work is needed to better identify a precise estimate of
labour supply elasticity.16 To correctly estimate the labour supply elasticity, what
is really needed is a shock to the marginal revenue product of labour that causes
exogenous variation in wages without a¤ecting the labour supply. This calls for an
instrumental variable estimation. Before turning to these issues, in next subsection
I present estimates of labour supply elasticity from a dynamic model.
3.4 Wage Elasticities of Separations and Estimates from a
Dynamic Model
The starting point of the analysis is the dynamic model of monopsony by Burdett
and Mortensen (1998) presented in the theoretical section. In that context, the
equilibrium level of employment L(w) is equal to the ratio of the ow of recruits
R(w) to the separation rate s(w). If one can estimate separately the wage elasticity
of separations and recruits, then it is possible to get an estimate of the elasticity
of labour supply to the wage as di¤erence between the two. The good news is that
estimating the wage elasticity of separations is relatively simple, while it is more
di¢ cult to estimate the wage elasticity of recruits.
Following Manning (2003), I showed the relation between the two elasticities
and demonstrate (see equation (9)) that in a steady state equilibrium, the following
relation holds "sw =  "Rw: The intuition behind this result is very simple: one
separation corresponds to a recruit, conditional on the fact it is related to the wage.
Note also that specications above assume that separations to non-employment
and recruitment from non-employment are not related to wages. Relaxing this
assumption, the labour supply elasticity can be written as follows
"Lw = R"
e
Rw + (1  R)"nRw   S"esw   (1  S)"nsw; (12)
where R is the share of recruits from employment and S is the share of separations
to another job; in a steady state they are the same. In previous section, I showed
that under certain conditions "esw =  "eRw holds; while "nsw is easily estimated from
separations to non-employment.
16Measurement error issues, as discussed by Manning (2003) do not seem to be very relevant
in this case. The main reason is the nature of the administrative data, these are supposed not
to have these problems.
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Table 8: Separation Elasticities to the Wage
Men Women
All separations coe¤. obs psd-R2 coe¤. obs psd-R2
Mean separation rate 0:23 322; 508 0:20 211; 765
No controls  0:506
(0:0029)
277; 918 0:14  0:468
(0:0035)
179; 668 0:12
With controls  0:448
(0:0039)
277; 815 0:26  0:351
(0:0048)
179; 615 0:24
Tenure controls  0:432
(0:0042)
277; 815 0:26  0:341
(0:0050)
179; 615 0:25
Sep to empl.
Mean separation rate 0:13 322; 508 0:12 211; 765
No controls  0:228
(0:0031)
277; 918 0:03  0:206
(0:0033)
179; 668 0:03
With controls  0:234
(0:0067)
277; 815 0:13  0:164
(0:0046)
179; 615 0:11
Tenure controls  0:224
(0:0062)
277; 815 0:13  0:159
(0:0049)
179; 615 0:11
Sep. to non-empl.
Mean separation rate 0:10 322; 508 0:08 211; 765
No controls  0:429
(0:0050)
277; 918 0:13  0:379
(0:0038)
179; 668 0:10
With controls  0:262
(0:0049)
277; 815 0:24  0:199
(0:0048)
179; 615 0:21
Tenure controls  0:266
(0:0048)
277; 815 0:24  0:193
(0:0051)
179; 615 0:21
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
For wage elasticity from non-employment things are more complicated. In this
case, I use the formula below proposed by Manning (2003)
"nRw(w) = "
e
Rw(w)  w; (13)
where w is the coe¢ cient for the wage in a logit model where the dependent
variable is the probability of job to job transition.
The estimation strategy is the following. First, I estimate separation elastic-
ities of wages "sw, i.e., the probability of job change on the overall sample; the
probability of job to job on the sample of changers on the wage "esw; the proba-
bility of job to non-employment on the wage for the sample of changers "nsw. I do
this in three steps, rst only the log of wage is on the right hand side, then I add
controls for age, experience, number of weeks paid during the year, occupation,
sector, region, level of bargaining agreement. Finally I also control for tenure. I
summarise my results in Table 8.
Wage elasticities of separations are estimated between  0:51 and  0:15 with
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Table 9: Elasticity of Labour Supply
Men Women
controls no contr. controls no contr.
Elast. of separat. to empl. "esw =  "eRw  0:234  0:228  0:164  0:206
Elast. of separat. to non-empl. "nsw  0:262  0:429  0:199  0:379
Share of separat. to employment S 0:56 0:56 0:58 0:58
w 0:184 0:274 0:085 0:250
Elasticity of labour supply "Lw 0:400 0:424 0:307 0:380
some di¤erences between men and women. Men have somewhat higher wage elas-
ticities, indicating that separations are more related to money reasons, while for
women nancial reasons seem to be less important for the moving decision. Re-
sults indicate also that wage elasticities of separations to non employment are
higher. Adding controls, the size of these elasticities declines substantially, espe-
cially for women. Including previous tenure controls further reduces the size of the
coe¢ cients but not very much.17
Then, I use the wage elasticity of separations to employment "esw to recover
the wage elasticity of recruits from employment "eRw. The separation elasticity to
non employment "nsw is estimated on the sample of changers for those that dont
get a new job when moving. The elasticity of recruits from non-employment is
estimated using the elasticity of recruits from employment and the adjustment
described above using equation (13). Results are as follows: for men (women), the
proportion of jobs terminating into another job (when restricting the sample to
workers with less than 24 months of non-employment) is equal to 0:56 (0:58), the
coe¢ cient on log wage w without controls is 0:274 (0:250), while the coe¢ cient
with controls is 0:184 (0:085). Finally, all wage elasticities and proportions of
separations to employment and recruits from employment are used in equation
(12) to calculate the elasticity of labour supply.
Results are reported in Table 9. Again, the elasticity of labour supply is esti-
mated low (around 0:4 for men and 0:3 for women), denitely lower than the one
estimated before using reverse regression methods. The empirical model is able to
show expected di¤erences between men and women with the latter having again
lower elasticities. This again suggests that the monopsony model in its dynamic
(oligopsonistic) version can help to explain the wage gender di¤erential.
17Here I dont consider any endogeneity issue for tenure.
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3.5 Evidence from a NaturalExperiment
Previous results indicate that estimating the labour supply elasticity is not a simple
task because of endogeneity issues and the relative biases involved. Although some
empirical predictions of the monopsony model are veried in the data, with some
success with respect to other di¤erent theories of wage determination, they are
still not very clear-cut and further work is needed to identify the source of bias
in standard OLS regressions. In principle, as Manning (2003) also suggests, what
is really needed to correctly estimate the labour supply elasticity is a rm level
demand shock that doesnt a¤ect supply, so that exogenous shifts in demand trace
out the supply curve. The instrument should have an impact on the particular
rm but not on the market as a whole, i.e., it shouldnt increase the overall level
of wages and it should inuence supply only indirectly through the wage.18
One possibility is that of using exogenous variation in wages that is driven by
institutional factors. This is the classic case in the natural experiment literature.
However, these changes have an e¤ect on the population as a whole, so there is no
control group to evaluate the e¤ects of this intervention. However, identication
is still possible by looking at di¤erent e¤ects of this change across di¤erent parts
of the wage distribution or across di¤erent time periods. Institutional changes in
Italian industrial relations and wage bargaining can play this role. Until 1992, an
automatic indexation mechanism called Scala Mobile (SM) was protecting workers
from loss in their purchasing power, i.e., adjusting wages to the cost of living.19
After various changes in its structure, and many political and economic debates,
the escalator clause has been eventually abandoned. Clearly, the SM had a sub-
stantial impact on the wage distribution. In particular, it had a di¤erent impact
on men and women, a¤ecting the wage gap in di¤erent ways. Giving the same
absolute wage increase to all workers, the SM had larger impact on women as
their wages where lower and more likely to be observed at the bottom of the wage
distribution (see Manacorda, 2004). In other words, the SM was operating as a
minimum wage.
In this context, the abolition of the SM, and the subsequent increase in the
18Sullivan (1989), Boal (1995), Falch (2003), Staiger et al. (2004), and Hirsch and Schumacher
(2004) are examples of applications of monopsony to di¤erent labour markets. The main idea
of these studies is that of testing the theory using particular labour markets that can be consid-
ered as very close to the ideal textbook model of monopsony. Main empirical applications are
referred to nurses, school teachers, workers in the coal mining sector. Most of them use natural
experiments and IV estimates to identify the e¤ects they want to study. Fakhfakh and Fitzroy
(2006) use rm data to test the monopsony model providing evidence of strong size e¤ects and
positive e¤ects of employment expansion on wages.
19See Erickson and Ichino (1995) for a rst evaluation of the e¤ects of SM on gender di¤erentials
in the 1970s and 1980s and Manacorda (2004) for a recent application to analyse fall and rise in
wage inequality in Italy.
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relative wage di¤erential between men and women, should have an impact on
relative employment. If labour markets are competitive, then increases in the rel-
ative wage di¤erential in favor of men should determine an increase in the relative
employment of women (demand side e¤ect).20 However, if the labour market is
monopsonistic, the increase in relative wages can have a positive e¤ect on relative
employment of men, the reason being that the labour supply to the individual
rm is positively sloped. Of course, I also need to control for relative changes in
the composition of skills in the workforce and its relative shifts that can inuence
the gender and employment di¤erential. In particular, educational attainment can
be controlled using the composition of the workforce in terms of skills. In this
case, age composition is not very important as I am using a sample of very young
workers.21
The exercise proceeds as follows: rst, I calculate relative wages of men and
women at each rm for the years 1985, 1990, 1992 and 1996. Second, for each
establishment, I derive the proportion of men and women as represented in the
sample of workers, and multiply this percentage by the number of workers cur-
rently employed at the rm, obtaining the (predicted) number of men and women
employed. This allows me to calculate relative employment at each rm, so that I
have information on the percentage di¤erence in wages and employment between
men and women. The two subperiods are 1991-1985 (before) and 1996-1992 (after).
The rst step in the analysis is to check the following relationship
log
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where " is the error term, t = 1991; 1996 and t   5 = 1985; 1992 respectively.
Equation (14) simply says that the evolution of the relative wage di¤erential should
be correlated with the initial relative wage di¤erential. I expect that for rms with
higher gender wage gap at the beginning of the period, this will be reduced over
time. If the hypothesis of di¤erent market mechanisms at work in the two periods
is true, I expect in the second period a smaller coe¢ cient. The reason is that, in
the rst period, strong collective bargaining agreements had stronger impact on
the reduction of the di¤erential because SM was sustaining wages at the bottom
of the wage distribution. After the abolition of the SM, initial wage di¤erentials
are still negatively related to changes in the di¤erentials, but market forces should
20Note also this is true in the right to manage model with unions where rms are on their
demand curve.
21Before proceeding, it is important to mention that the data is a representative sample of
workers in the population. Of course, the ideal would be to have a sample of rms, but as
long as this data is missing, I use information on rms these workers are currently employed at.
Results should be interpreted with strong caution.
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Table 10: Evidence of Relative Employment E¤ects from a "Natural Experiment"
Dependent variable Change in relat. wages Change in relat. empl.
before after before after before after
Estimation method OLS (1) OLS (2) OLS (3) OLS (4) IV (5) IV (6)
Initial relat. wages  0:667
(0:1084)
 0:499
(0:0599)
       
Change in relat. wages      0:335
(0:3833)
0:083
(0:2485)
 0:191
(0:8609)
 0:224
(0:5532)
Change in skill comp.      0:441
(0:7616)
 1:147
(0:3016)
 0:467
(0:7567)
 1:151
(0:3041)
Constant 0:062
(0:0189)
0:068
(0:0125)
0:141
(:0975)
0:039
(:0523)
0:137
(0:1022)
0:044
(0:0531)
Observations 84 217 84 217 84 217
R2 0:23 0:18 0:01 0:05    
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
reduce the coe¢ cient. Results in columns (1) and (2) of Table 10 conrm this
intuition.
The second regression to be estimated reads as follows
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where X is a set of controls dened below. Again, equation (15) has to be esti-
mated for both periods, before and after the abolition of SM. In this case, it is
also important to control for relative demand shifts that could inuence relative
employment of men and women. For this reason, I include relative changes in the
percentage of white collars against blue collars as a proxy for the relative change
in skills at each rm.22 Before the abolition of SM, relative wage changes were
mostly driven by institutional factors, hence, when estimating equation (15), I
should observe a strong negative relation between changes in relative employment
and changes in relative wages (employment is determined by labour demand). On
the other hand, if the market is monopsonistic, after the abolition of the SM, the
magnitude of the coe¢ cient should be reduced. In other words, the abolition of
SM could provide a test for discriminating between the monopsony model and the
competitive (or union) model.23 Main results of the analysis are summarised in
Table 10, columns (3) and (4).
22As Manning (2003) suggests, there could be a positive correlation between relative wage
changes and relative demand shifts determining a bias the coe¢ cient on relative wage changes
(this happens when market factors are more important).
23In this context I didnt mention the role of unions, more on this below.
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As already noted, changes in relative wages of men are strongly negatively
correlated with the relative wage di¤erential at the beginning of each period. Al-
though the statistical signicance of the exercise is very low; interestingly, there is
a strong negative relationship between changes in relative employment and rela-
tive wages of men in the rst period. As expected, when rms choose the optimal
combination of workers to employ, they choose to hire less men as their wages
are higher. This indicates that rms are on their demand curve, no matter if
the correctmodel is the competitive or the right-to-manage model with unions.
However, after the abolition of the SM, the relationship between relative employ-
ment and wages turns out to be positive, even again it is important to stress this
is not statistically signicant. This is exactly what in principle is predicted by the
monopsony model.24 Finally, in the last two columns of Table 10, I report results
for IV estimates. I instrument the relative wage change with relative wage at the
beginning of the period. Using IV, evidence of a negative relation between relative
wage and employment changes emerges in both periods. However, results are in-
conclusive and the overall statistical signicance of this exercise is very weak. I now
turn to comparison of these results for the estimation of labour supply elasticity
and to results obtained in the literature.
Overall results are in line with those obtained by Manning (2003) for the UK
using the BHPS.25 Results are consistent with expectations in terms of magnitude
of coe¢ cients. First, both studies nd that estimates of the labour supply elasticity
using employer size wage e¤ects are quite high; as expected the e¤ect is larger in
Britain, where decentralised bargaining and less unionised labour market can drive
this result. His estimate of the employer size-wage is equal to 0.06 for the whole
sample in the UK against 0.03 for women and 0.04 for men in my study. Again,
results from reverse regressions, indicate that there is a substantial gap between
wages paid and marginal product, this gap is lower in the UK, as predicted by the
monopsony model. Estimates of the labour supply elasticity are 0.37 for Great
Britain against an average of about 0.30 for Italy. In addition, the elasticity of
labour supply obtained using dynamic models is estimated close to 0.7 for the UK
against 0.4 and 0.3 for Italy. Interestingly, comparison of results also indicates that
the direction of di¤erent biases goes in the same direction, indicating that further
research is needed to give a better estimate of the elasticity of labour supply.
24Remember that in equation (15) I also control for relative skill composition of workers by
adding on the right hand side the di¤erence in percentage of white collars and blue collars
employees at that rm in di¤erent periods. This should proxy for relative demand shocks in
employment and technological progress.
25See Tables 4.5 and 4.10 in his study.
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4 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, I study gender wage di¤erentials using the static classic model of
monopsony and the dynamic Burdett and Mortensen (1998) equilibrium search
model with frictions. In particular, I exploit equilibrium relations and empirical
implications of the theoretical models in terms of ows and distributions to analyse
the dynamics of gender wage di¤erentials in Italy. I provide di¤erent estimates of
the labour supply elasticity facing an individual employer to prove rm can wage
discriminate and pay lower wages to women. I also exploit a naturalexperiment
(the abolition of a wage indexation mechanism that took place in Italy in 1991)
to test the monopsony model against other models of wage determination.
Given a labour supply curve to the rm not perfectly elastic as it is assumed
in the competitive labour market, rms can wage discriminate between men and
women because the two groups have di¤erent labour supply elasticities. There
are many reasons for this di¤erential outcomes between men and women, these
are mirrored in structural transition parameters of the equilibrium model. Some
possible explanations for di¤erent turnover behaviour of men and women are in
di¤erent levels of search frictions they face.
Results indicate that women have somewhat larger benets from working at
bigger rms and consequently lower labour supply elasticity, as predicted by the
monopsony model. Employer size e¤ects by sector of activity indicate that larger
e¤ects (especially for women) are in less unionised sectors, where bargaining agree-
ments give employers the possibility of negotiating part of the compensation pack-
age directly with workers. The labour supply elasticity calculated by looking at
the employer size e¤ect is quite high, but still far from the perfectly competitive
approximation. An estimate of the labour supply elasticity calculated using sep-
aration functions and the dynamic structure of the monopsony model give quite
lower values for this elasticity, especially for women. Finally, the institutional
change in wage indexation mechanism at work in Italy (abolition of Scala Mobile)
shows a positive correlation between the relative changes in male/female employ-
ment and relative changes in the gender wage di¤erential, even if the statistical
signicance of the exercise is weak. I interpret this qualitative results in favor
of the monopsony model against the labour demand model (with unions), that
seemed a good theoretical benchmark for the period before the reform.
The aim of this paper was to try to shed some light on the capacity of a
monopsony model to interpret some stylised facts we observe in the labour market
data. Despite Italians labour market is often considered as strongly centralised
with powerful unions, the empirical evidence o¤ered in this paper shows that is not
the whole story and that changes in the institutional framework give employers
some monopsony power. Recognising this fact, helps to better understand the
workings of the labour market and to improve policy prescriptions.
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